

SMP Annex 1: Security Risk Assessment (SRA)

Response – Recovery – Resilience for Conflict Affected Communities in Ethiopia (3R-4- CACE)

June 2022

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Summary

Date of Assessment	May 2022	
Type of Assessment	Remote, desktop based, with interviews with personnel from a range of international and humanitarian organisations familiar with the security situation and operating environment.	
Key Threats/ Hazards Identified	Unexploded Ordnance (UXO)/ Explosive Remnants of War (ERW)	UNACCEPTABLE
	Sexual Exploitation & Abuse (SEA) of project personnel/ beneficiaries	HIGH
	Collateral Damage/ Harm to Personnel/ Assets	VERY HIGH
	Criminal Targeting of Project Assets	HIGH
	Direct Targeting of Project Personnel	VERY HIGH
Key recommended mitigation measures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Recruit a dedicated security coordinator to oversee the implantation of security measures and incident management ▪ Engage local communities and other stakeholders for investment in project success, including consequences for when security guarantees are not met (Red Lines) ▪ Close liaison with UNMAS and other demining agencies, as well as C-IED/ Search military units, and arrange a ‘Training of Trainers’ session for key Project staff, to be cascaded as staff numbers grow ▪ Incident reporting structures formalised and communicated, both to staff and beneficiaries ▪ Pre-identify possible sources of psychosocial and medical support in project implementation areas, should security incidents affecting personnel take place ▪ Pre-departure checks to be carried out for all field travel, and vehicles must be equipped with emergency items, including first aid kits ▪ Coordination and deconfliction with Ethiopian Defence Forces and regional armed forces 	
Assessment Summary		
<p>The implementation of the 3R-4-CACE Project in the Regions initially selected (Oromia, Amhara, Afar, Benishangul Gumuz, and Tigray Regions) will likely be met by significant safety and security risks that must not be underestimated. Although only Tigray Region is classified by the Government of Ethiopia as an active conflict setting (and thus implementation will be let by UNICEF and UNOPS under the aegis of UNDSS), the remaining four regions are not without their challenges.</p> <p>UXO/ ERW contamination, ongoing military operations, increasing criminality, and civil unrest, as well as reports of fatalities of government employees as a result of security incidents all indicate an operating environment in need of dedicated security risk management.</p> <p>Without a responsive and agile security risk management system, project implementation risks either being limited to urban centres or major programme disruption due to delays and losses in the field.</p>		

Acronyms & Abbreviations	
3R-4-CACE	Response – Recovery – Resilience for Conflict Affected Communities in Ethiopia
ACLED	Armed Conflict Location & Event Data
CMT	Crisis Management Team
EDF	Ethiopian Defence Forces
ERW	Explosive Remnants of War
ESCP	Environment and Social Commitment Plan
ESSF	Environmental and Social Standards Framework
GBV	Gender Based Violence
GoE	Government of Ethiopia
HROC	High Risk of Ongoing Conflict
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
IDF	Indirect Fire
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
MoF	Ministry of Finance
NROC	Non-High Risk of Ongoing Conflict
PCP	Project Continuity Plan
SEA	Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
SMP	Security Management Plan
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SRA	Security Risk Assessment
UAG	Unknown Armed Groups
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
PCU	Project Coordination Unit
PIU	Project Implementation Unit
RTA	Road Traffic Accident
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WBG	World Bank Group
WNCCA	Woreda Needs, Conflict, and Capacity Assessments

Objective

The objective of this assessment is to identify the safety and security risks originating from the threats and hazards of the operating environment, that might impact negatively on the 3R-4-CACE Project. Once identified, this assessment will outline options to reduce the vulnerability of the project, and mitigate against the identified risks.

This security risk assessment is concerned with reducing risk, and it does not offer any guarantee that incidents will not occur. It is also subject to adaptation and adjustment in line with situational judgement.

The Security Risk Assessment (SRA), aside from operational good practice, is a required by the World Bank Group (WBG) as part of its Environmental and Social Framework (ESF).

Scope of Security Risk Assessment (SRA)

This assessment is to cover all aspects of the 3R-4-CACE project. Project spending comes with an associated duty of care responsibility by the World Bank Group.

A Project SRA process should be carried out on a quarterly basis, or following significant change in operating environment, or significant change in project modality. This is including but not limited to:

- Expansion to other Regions
- New project activities
- Engagement of additional/ new implementing partners

Before starting activities in a new location, an SRA should be carried out to identify the threats and hazards specific to those areas. It is the responsibility of the PCU to ensure such assessments are carried out.

Activities

The activities forecasted for project implantation are varied, and will depend on the requirements of each location. However, broadly speaking, the following activities may reasonably be expected to be carried out, and will be considered for the purposes of this SRA:

- Mobile health services
- Provision of essential medicines
- Rapid renovation of health, education, and WASH facilities
- Speed learning activities (read@home)
- Water trucking
- Community care centres
- Rapid need assessments
- Capacity building activities
- Renovating, reconstruction and building new social services
- Provision of hygiene materials
- Hygiene education
- One-Stop-Centres and other GBV activities, including shelters
- Small-scale infrastructure investments

Covered Persons

See Labour Plan for additional information on labour considerations.

Largely, personnel covered by this assessment fall into one of four categories:

- Personnel employed by the Government of Ethiopia to implement the project and its activities
- Staff of partner organisations, such as UNICEF and UNOPS
- Personnel of their subcontracts or implementing partners
- Beneficiaries of the project and local communities

Locations

The 3R-4-CACE will be implemented in a range of locations and contexts. The proposed Regions in which the project will be initially implemented are the Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Benishangul Gumuz and Oromia Regions, with target woredas and kebeles pending the damage assessment report (anticipated in June 2022).

Each region presents its own unique context and history, as well as massive variation of operating environments within the Regions. These include, but are not limited to:

- Urban areas
- Remote rural areas
- Non-Government controlled areas
- Volatile regional border areas
- Areas in which insurgencies and counter-insurgency military operations are ongoing
- IDP camps, including of mixed ethnicities
- Sudanese border areas

Assets

Listed below are the assets required for project implementation, the security of which this assessment will seek to maintain.

Asset Type	Purpose	Key dependencies
Vehicles (either rented or purchased)	Transport of staff and materials to project locations	Fuel Maintenance, including spare parts Secure storage locations on-site or easily accessible
ICT equipment (including mobile phones and laptops)	Coordination and transfer of information between project locations, between partners, and between the field and management Storage of key data	Access to networks Access to electricity for charging devices
Construction materials	Rehabilitation of health/ education/ GBV/ social facilities	Secure storage locations, sheltered from the elements
Buildings and property (rented or purchased)	Sites for both project implementation and administration Some program activities consist of static sites, such as health facilities or women's shelters	N/A
Beneficiary Data	Project implementation, as well as monitoring and evaluation activities	Access to either manual filing or IT systems (see Communications Equipment)
Project Personnel Data	Project administration, such as salaries and labour management	
Cash	Payments for project assets and services, salaries for project personnel Implementation modality, such as cash for GBV survivors to assist in access to services	Functioning banking system Availability of ETB Functioning payment modalities, such as mobile money platforms

Context Assessment

See the MoF Draft Comprehensive Social Assessment Report and WBG 3R-4-CACE Project Appraisal Document for an in-depth exploration of the operating environment.

Context in General

Though the security risk situation has improved in the last six months, significant operational challenges remain. According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED), the five targeted regions have seen the highest numbers of conflict and security incidents in the last six months (November 2021 – April 2022), with Oromia, Amhara and Afar having incident numbers well into the hundreds. The majority of these have been conflict in nature, and whilst direct targeting of aid and development staff has reportedly been minimal, direct targeting of government staff has been reported, and such conflict activity suggests a considerable threat of collateral damage to reconstruction operations in these Regions.

Regional Context Overview




Figure 1: Regional context overview. Basemap Source: WBG

Risk Analysis

Project-Specific Threat & Hazard Assessment

Security Threats	Details <i>(What, who, when, why, how?)</i>	3R-4-CACE Exposure <i>(What about the project could increase the risk?)</i>	Gender, Diversity & Inclusion Considerations <i>(Are people of a certain gender, identity, or background disproportionately affected?)</i>	Geographical Considerations <i>(Has this affected some locations more than others?)</i>
Criminal targeting of Project assets (robbery/ theft)	Opportunistic and organised criminal activity amidst increasing prices and cost of living, possible resulting in the injury of personnel	The project will require vehicles, equipment, and cash for implementation, as well as use of building materials, all of which may be attractive to criminal actors Further, given the high-profile nature of the project and associated funding, could increase attractiveness to adversaries	-	Generally, security incidents are more likely in transit, however site entry cannot be discounted. Settings where perceptions of a capable guardian or law enforcement may be weak.
Sexual Exploitation & Abuse (SEA)	Sexual violence – including verbal and physical assault and harassment affecting Project personnel and/or beneficiaries	Although SEA concerns can affect all genders, women are disproportionately impacted and women employees, partners and service providers will be pivotal for project implementation.	Women project staff will be in place for implementation of activities such as GBV responses Use of armed personnel/ security forces for securing project activities could have a triggering impact for GBV survivors accessing project services Survivors who are women or from minority groups may also be less inclined to report incidents of SEA.	Applicable in all areas of operations.
Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) / Explosive Remnants of	As the result of both current and historical conflicts, devices (projectiles, mines, IEDs, ammunition) that have not detonated on impact, which could	Possibility of encountering UXO/ ERW during construction activities, causing significant damage, injury or death to project personnel and assets.	-	Areas of current or historical conflict. However, devices can migrate and remain inert for decades; caution is

War (ERW) contamination	explode if disturbed Potential for death or injury to people and animals in the vicinity	Schools and health facilities have been identified as sites of particular concern due to their use during conflict activities.		required in all locations
Collateral harm to project personnel/ damage to project assets	Conflict activity - e.g., airstrikes, armed clashes, inter-communal violence, IDF - is ongoing in all proposed Regions of operation and may result in non-deliberate harm to personnel or damage to assets/ sites.	Project implementation will be widespread, and given the sporadic nature of the conflict, situations can be volatile and subject to rapid change. Exposure to 'wrong place, wrong time' type incidents are thus a key concern.	Sexual violence has been identified as a 'weapon of war', targeting women and girls.	Areas of shifting control between actors, or where military operations are ongoing Regional border areas Rural areas
Abduction/ illegal detention	The detention by personnel by non-state actors against their will. This may be followed by a ransom demand, creating a kidnapping situation driven by criminal rather than political intent.	Given the high-profile nature of the project, personnel may be seen as valuable in pursuing interests of certain groups. Similarly, personnel may be of interest for criminals hoping to extract a ransom. Given the widespread implementation of the project, and likely time spent in transit, abduction is a possibility for project staff in the field.	Illegal detention has been known to target individuals along ethnographic lines, dependent on where the incident takes place.	In transit in areas of shifting control between actors Regional border areas Rural and urban areas
Harassment of project staff	Disgruntled beneficiaries, host communities or other stakeholders may target Project staff. Harassment may be verbal, with the potential to escalate into physical assault.	Inevitably some communities or groups may receive assistance over others, or perceive unfairness in the assistance provided. Delays, changes of plan, and miscommunication may also lead to a deterioration in community relations.	Women and minority groups are known to experience greater degrees of harassment due to power dynamics in a situation. They may also be less inclined to report incidents of harassment.	Not restricted to certain areas, although may be more common at implementation locations.
Demonstration/ civil unrest	Disgruntled beneficiaries, host communities or other stakeholders	Inevitably some communities or groups may receive assistance over others, or perceive unfairness in the	-	Urban areas in particular, high profile locations, or other locations

	<p>may mobilise.</p> <p>Demonstrations may occur for other, non-project related reasons that may disrupt activities, e.g. causing roadblocks.</p> <p>Possible to also escalate to harassment or assault of staff, or damage to project assets or sites (see below)</p>	<p>assistance provided.</p> <p>The scale of the project may take it into areas where there are social tensions that could ignite.</p>		with high concentrations of people.
Vandalism/ deliberate destruction of project assets or sites	<p>Criminals, disgruntled personnel, or unknown armed groups may deliberately target project assets or sites, possibly to express grievance or issue a warning/ threat.</p>	<p>Operations in a range of settings, including those where there are competing interests between groups and possible grievance with the project.</p>	-	Settings where perceptions of a capable guardian or law enforcement may be weak.
Safety hazards at project sites	<p>Hazards such as falling objects, trip hazards, accidental fire, sharp objects, falls, misuse of construction tools.</p>	<p>Project activities include reconstruction and renovation of health, education, and other facilities.</p> <p>WASH programming may also include construction activities and excavation.</p>	-	Construction sites
Direct targeting of project staff	<p>Deliberate killing or injury of government personnel involved in reconstruction and recovery activities by unknown armed groups.</p> <p>Escalation of harassment by or tensions with beneficiaries or host communities, resulting in violence.</p>	<p>Project implementation will be widespread, with those in most need possibly in the most remote places within the reach of OAG actors.</p> <p>Fluctuating presence and areas of control may create a challenging stakeholder engagement/ access negotiation environment</p> <p>Inevitably some communities or groups may receive assistance over others, or perceive unfairness in the assistance provided.</p>	<p>Targeting has historically taken place along ethnographic lines, putting minority groups at greater risk.</p> <p>Sexual violence has been identified as a 'weapon of war', targeting women and girls.</p>	<p>Areas of shifting control between actors</p> <p>Regional border areas</p> <p>Rural areas</p>

Operational & Safety Hazards	Details	3R-4-CACE Project Exposure	Untreated Risk Rating	Operational & Safety Hazards
Road traffic accidents (RTA)	Collisions involving vehicles and in some cases pedestrians.	As the project will involve travel by road for some activities, the exposure to RTA is significant.	-	All locations where vehicles are used
Covid-19 and other medical concerns	Malaria, food poisoning, Covid-19, HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis (TB) and dengue fever are among the medical conditions that can affect personnel, causing a risk of death or serious illness.	Project personnel will be in close proximity to others, particularly in large numbers. Medical attention may be inaccessible in some areas where activities are planned, making treatment difficult and raising the possibility of serious illness.	Women and those from minority groups may experience greater challenges when seeking medical attention, such as increased risk when travelling long distances through remote areas	No specific geographical constraints, although risk may increase in remote areas where medical attention is least accessible.
Dangerous wildlife	Biting and venomous insects, wild dogs, hyenas, snakes and other hazardous fauna present a risk to personnel.	Project activities in rural areas have a heightened risk of encountering dangerous animals.	-	No specific geographical constraints, although risk may increase in remote areas where medical attention is least accessible and wildlife is more common.
Flooding	The Ethiopian rainy season can lead to extensive flooding, even in urban areas where there is continuous attention to infrastructure. In rural areas, roads and other infrastructure may become unusable by vehicles or damaged. Deterioration in road conditions may also lead to increased risk of RTA.	Construction activities rely on weather conditions to some extent, including delivery of materials. Road travel will be integral to project activities, and may be disrupted by flooded routes and increased RTA numbers.	-	Rural areas may be particularly effected, especially where transit routes are not tarmacked.

Potential Impact of Public/ Private Security on Communities

Security services may be delivered by a range of actors, including both private security companies as well as state actors (such as the army or police). Both have their advantages and disadvantages, and their distinctions must be recognized.

The use of armed security forces during project activities (e.g., armed Ethiopian Defense Force escorts for Project convoys) have the advantage of being a deterrent to the casual assailant, either lacking in firearms or significant force. They can also engage an assailant, neutralizing a threat and if successful, allowing the convoy (for example) to proceed to its destination. However, as parties to the conflict the use of state forces may in fact be a draw to unknown armed groups (UAGs) who wish to target state assets, have access to firearms, and have significant tactical advantages in some locations. These locations are also reportedly prone to fluctuation.

Further, this risk of use of lethal force in conjunction with project activities and cause difficulties in maintaining a 'do no harm approach'. The complexities of the conflict dynamics, including the origins of UAGs or other assailants, their roles within communities, and the influence they exert, could mean that participating in armed conflict could impact negatively on Project standing with communities and access to those in need.

Protection services may be provided through the use of unarmed security personnel hired from private companies, who can carry out tasks such as access control, CCTV and perimeter monitoring, asset management, and personnel searches. Although they may not be a deterrent to the committed assailant, or able to provide a significant response capability, they can provide the presence of a capable guardian and convey that security is a key concern of the Project, and incidents will be followed up on. However, such services will incur additional cost, and security incidents (such as harassment, assault, theft) linked with the engagement of such services are not unknown.

The Potential for Exacerbation of Existing Conflict

As with all projects aimed at reconstruction and recovery (as well as new constructions), there is the potential for activities to exacerbate and even trigger tensions and conflicts within communities. Reconstruction efforts in one location and not the other can lead to perceptions of unfairness, and diminish the legitimacy of the project in the eyes of communities. This can lead to targeting of Project assets and personnel as a form of warning, as well as theft of resources those in need may see as those they are entitled to.

Activities such as distributions may also give rise to security concerns, both for the above reason, and as a result of large gatherings of people in desperate need, which can result in extreme behaviour should needs not be met. Violence, harassment, and civil unrest as a result of activities can be mitigated through good practices (well-organised activities and transparent selection criteria), attending to the basic needs of beneficiaries (water, shade, toilets), and communicating with communities throughout the process.

Recruitment could be another source of security concerns, with risks of perceptions of favouritism that could threaten perceptions of the impartiality of the project. Recruitment grievances are often the root cause of incidents of harassment and threatening behaviour targeting staff in a development context. Once again, transparency and good practices are key in navigating such a complex environment.

Overall, project implementation – if community tensions and vulnerabilities are not considered - could negatively impact the Project's standing within communities, compromising an acceptance security management approach.

Risk Matrix

At the heart of security management planning is the identification and understanding of possible events or developments that could cause harm to personnel, assets, activities and the reputation of the enterprise.

A Security Risk Assessment process should be carried out annually or in response to a significant change in context, to ensure security risk management measures are appropriate.

Likelihood	VERY Likely	LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH	VERY HIGH	UNACCEPTABLE
	Likely	LOW	MEDIM	HIGH	HIGH	VERY HIGH
	Moderately Likely	LOW	LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH	HIGH
	Unlikely	LOW	LOW	LOW	MEDIUM	MEDIUM
	Very Unlikely	LOW	LOW	LOW	LOW	LOW
Risk Analysis Matrix¹		Negligible	Minor	Moderate	Severe	Critical
		Impact				

Impact rating	
Negligible	Little disruption to activities, no injuries to personnel, and no damage to assets
Minor	Delays to activities OR injuries/ possible stress to personnel (no medical attention required) OR possible damage or loss of assets
Moderate	Delays to activities (<7 days) OR non-life-threatening injuries/ high stress OR some loss of damage to assets
Severe	Significant disruption to activities (7 days +) OR severe injuries to personnel requiring emergency medical attention OR significant loss of assets
Critical	Cancellation of activities OR death/ severe injuries to project personnel OR major/ total loss of assets

What is the likelihood of this threat/ hazard taking place in 3R-4-CACE implementing areas, and what would the impact be?			
Threat/ Hazard	Impact	Likelihood	Risk Rating
Criminal targeting of Project assets (robbery/ theft)	Moderate	Likely	High
Sexual Exploitation & Abuse (SEA) of project personnel/ beneficiaries	Severe	Moderately Likely	High
Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) / Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) contamination	Critical	Very Likely	Unacceptable
Flooding	Moderate	Likely	High
Collateral harm to project personnel/	Critical	Likely	Very High

¹ UNSMS Security Policy Manual

damage to project assets			
Abduction/ illegal detention of project staff	Severe	Unlikely	High
Harassment of project staff	Minor	Likely	High
Demonstration/ civil unrest in project areas	Minor	Likely	Medium
Vandalism/ deliberate destruction of project assets or sites	Moderate	Unlikely	Low
Safety hazards at project sites	Moderate	Very Likely	High
Road traffic accidents (RTA)	Moderate	Very Likely	High
Direct targeting of project staff	Critical	Likely	Very High
Covid-19 and other medical concerns	Moderate	Moderately Likely	Medium
Dangerous wildlife in project areas	Moderate	Unlikely	Low

Mitigation Measures

Having identified the key safety and security threats and hazards to personnel involved in the Project, appropriate security risk mitigation measures must be identified, and their implementation planned for. The following mitigation measures should be treated as a baseline guide, to be adapted to operational reality as necessary, but never entirely abandoned.

Security risk mitigation usually falls into one of the following categories:

- **Transfer**
Shifting the forecasted damage from one party to another. This might include the use of insurance to transfer possible financial losses to an insurance provider, or the use of an implementing partner better equipped to deal with the security risks expected to be encountered.
- **Control**
Achieved through the use of procedures and other means, resulting in lowering either the impact of an undesirable event occurring, or reducing the likelihood of it happening in the first place. Note that even in the face of strict controls, risk can never be fully removed from an operational undertaking, and some degree of risk is inevitable.
- **Accept**
Nothing is done, with the potential damage being considered acceptable.
- **Avoid**
The circumstances in which the risk is assessed as being more likely are avoided. For instance, if RTA is identified as a key hazard, then road travel will not be undertaken.

Threat/ Hazard	Risk Rating	Proposed Mitigation Measure	Residual Risk Rating
Criminal targeting of Project assets (robbery/ theft)	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Access control in place at all sites, as far as reasonably practicable ▪ Use of unarmed guards/ watchpeople at project sites ▪ Asset management procedures, including inventories 	Medium

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Secure storage of assets, such as warehousing, as outlined in the SOPs Seek insurance for high value items Recruit dedicated security coordinator to oversee mitigation measures and incident management Cultivate strong culture of incident reporting and follow-up 	
Sexual Exploitation & Abuse (SEA) of project personnel/ beneficiaries	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> SEA briefings for all staff as part of safeguarding measures Incident reporting structures formalised and communicated, both to staff and beneficiaries Pre-identify possible sources of psychosocial, medical and other support for survivors in all areas of implementation 	Medium
Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) / Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) contamination	Unacceptable	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Identify key contacts in UNMAS and other demining agencies, as well as C-IED/ Search military units Ensure all staff are trained on UXO/ERW Awareness, and contracted labour are briefed on the UXO/ERW threat Pre-identify medical facilities in all areas of operations, investigate and test their facilities ahead of implementation Ensure at least one staff member on site is first aid trained, with a first aid kit available 	Medium
Flooding	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Pre-departure route checks as part of journey management Stock vehicles with appropriate emergency kit and communications Identify alternative routes to destinations ahead of travel 	Low
Collateral harm to project personnel/ damage to project assets	Very High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Cultivate strong community relationships and information sources Coordination and deconfliction with Ethiopian Defence Forces and regional armed forces Ensure pre-departure checks are carried out ahead of all journeys Recruit dedicated security coordinator to oversee mitigation measures and incident management 	Medium
Abduction/ illegal detention of project staff	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Recruit dedicated security coordinator to oversee mitigation measures and incident management Train a crisis management from senior project leadership Cultivate strong community relationships and information sources Employ journey management procedures, including route and destination checks prior to departure Use of armed escorts when specifically recommended as absolutely necessary 	Medium
Harassment of project staff	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Recruit dedicated security coordinator to oversee mitigation measures and incident management Prioritise community engagement and communications Cultivate strong culture of incident reporting and follow-up 	Medium

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Identify ‘Red Lines’ that will lead to a cessation of activities, and discuss these with communities 	
Demonstration/ civil unrest in project areas	Medium	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Recruit dedicated security coordinator to oversee mitigation measures and incident management Develop headcount and staff check-in procedures, as well as activity suspension and hibernation protocols 	Low
Safety hazards at project sites	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Employ and encourage good practices on site, such as fencing off excavations, keeping the site tidy and proper training on the use of tools Ensure project staff are equipped with adequate PPE When working with contractors, ensure safety obligations are captured at contracting stage Ensure fire safety equipment and procedures are in place at all sites Least hazardous materials should be preferred, and where necessary to use, hazardous materials must be handled and stored correctly Safety hazards must be managed in line with WBG EHS Guidelines. 	Low
Road traffic accidents (RTA)	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Train and monitor the performance of drivers, with disciplinary action linked with incidents where the driver is at fault (e.g. speeding) Vehicles equipped with emergency kit, including first aid kits Communications PACE planning Consider insurance for vehicles Set and brief staff on procedures, for instance, should a project vehicle hit a child 	Low
Direct targeting of project staff	Very High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Recruit dedicated security coordinator to oversee mitigation measures and incident management Engage local communities and other stakeholders for investment in project success, including deployment of confidential grievance redress mechanisms and consequences for when security guarantees are not met (Red Lines) Pre-departure checks on field travel Encourage staff to report on context dynamics and cultivate informal information gathering mechanisms All staff must report safety and security incidents, no matter how minor, as possible indicators of more significant problems 	Medium
Covid-19 and other medical concerns	Medium	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Brief all staff on possible medical concerns Pre-identify medical facilities in areas of project implementation 	Low